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Abstract
We study pricing by multiproduct rms in the context of unregulated monopoly,
regulated monopoly and Cournot oligopoly. Using the concept of consumer surplus
as a function of quantities (rather than prices), we present simple formulas for opti-
mal prices and show that Cournot equilibrium exists and corresponds to a Ramsey
optimum. We then present a tractable class of demand systems that involve a general-
ized form of homothetic preferences. As well as standard homothetic preferences, this
class includes linear and logit demand. Within the class, prot-maximizing quantities
are proportional to e¢ cient quantities. We discuss cost-passthrough, including cases
where optimal prices do not depend on other products costs. Finally, we discuss
optimal monopoly regulation when the rm has private information about its vector
of marginal costs, and show that if the probability distribution over costs satises an
independence property, then optimal regulation leaves relative price decisions to the
rm.
Keywords: Multiproduct pricing, homothetic preferences, Cournot oligopoly, monopoly
regulation, Ramsey pricing, cost passthrough, multidimensional screening.
JEL Classication: D42, D43, D82, L12, L13, L51.
1 Introduction
The theory of multiproduct pricing is a large and diverse subject. Unlike the single-product
case, a multiproduct rm must decide about the structure of its relative prices as well as
its overall price level. Classical questions include the characterization of optimal pricing
by a multiproduct monopolist seeking to maximize prot or, as with Ramsey pricing, the
most e¢ cient way to generate a specied level of prot when its choice for one price must
Both authors at All Souls College and the Department of Economics, University of Oxford. We
are grateful to Konrad Stahl (who discussed an early version this paper at the University of Mannheim
workshop on Multiproduct rms in industrial organization and international trade, 23-24 October, 2015)
and to Jonas Müller-Gastell for helpful comments.
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take into account its impact on demand for other products. Additional complexities arise
in oligopoly, when a multiproduct rm needs to choose prices to reect both intra-rm
substitution (or complementarity) features and inter-rm interactions. Optimal regulation
of a multiproduct rm with private information about its costs, say, must take into account
not just its likely average cost across all products but its pattern of relative costs.
In this paper we show how these issues can be illuminated by studying consumer prefer-
ences in terms of consumer surplus considered as a function of quantities (rather than the
more familiar function of prices).1 In section 2 we show how prot-maximizing and other
Ramsey prices, as well as prices in symmetric Cournot equilibrium, can be expressed as a
markup over marginal costs proportional to the derivative of this surplus function. In par-
ticular, a products optimal price is below marginal cost when consumer surplus decreases
with the supply of this product. We also show how a Cournot equilibrium corresponds
to an appropriate Ramsey optimum, and vice versa, which enables us to construct and
demonstrate existence of Cournot equilibrium in many cases.
A well-known feature of Ramsey pricing is that when required departures of optimal
quantities from e¢ cient quantities are small, then optimal quantities are approximately
proportional to the e¢ cient quantities. Thus, a reasonable rule of thumb is often to scale
down quantities equiproportionately relative to e¢ cient quantities, rather than to increase
prices equiproportionately above marginal cost. For larger departures of prices from costs,
though, optimal quantities are generally not proportional to e¢ cient quantities. In section
3, we specialise the demand system so that consumer surplus is a homothetic function
of quantities, which implies that relative quantities (or relative price-cost markups) do
not depend on the weight placed on prot in the Ramsey objective. As shown in section
3.2, this is quite a exible class of demand systems (much broader than the class where
consumer surplus is homothetic in prices), and as well as the obvious case of gross utility
being homothetic in quantities it includes linear and logit demands.
In section 3.3, we show that this property, together with assuming constant returns to
scale, simplies the analysis by allowing a multiproduct problem to be decomposed into two
steps: rst calculate the e¢ cient quantities which correspond to marginal cost pricing, and
second solve for the scale factor by which to reduce the e¢ cient quantities. This simplies
1Regarding consumer surplus as a function of quantities is apparently uncommon in the literature.
However, in the single-product context Bulow and Klemperer (2012) show this to be a valuable perspective.
(They regard consumer surplus as the area between the demand curve and the marginal revenue curve,
which is the same thing.)
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comparative static analysis, such as how monopoly (and oligopoly) prices vary with cost
parameters. In some leading examples there is zero cross-cost passthrough e.g., the
most protable price of each product depends only on its own cost and more generally
there are simple formulas for the size and sign of cross-cost e¤ects.
The fact that a prot-maximizing rm has e¢ cient incentives with respect to the pat-
tern, though of course not the level, of quantities has implications, moreover, for regulation
of multiproduct monopoly (section 3.4). It suggests that, in our class of demand systems,
it might be optimal for regulation to allow the monopolist considerable discretion over
the pattern of relative quantities (or prices). If the probability distribution over costs is
such that relative costs and average costs are stochastically independent, this intuition is
precisely correct and it is optimal for the choice of relative quantities to be delegated to
the rm.
Related literature: Baumol and Bradford (1970), and the many references therein,
discuss the economic principles of Ramsey pricing. They suggest (p. 271) that it is plausible
that the damage to welfare resulting from departures from marginal cost pricing will be
minimized if the relative quantities of the various products sold are kept unchanged from
their marginal cost pricing proportions.One aim of our paper is to make this intuition
precise in a broad class of demand systems.
Gorman (1961) described a class of utility functions such that income expansion paths
(or Engel curves) for quantities demanded were linear. This resembles our class of utility
functions, for which Ramsey quantities are equiproportional; that is, where the quantity
vector which maximizes consumer utility subject to a prot constraint expand linearly as
the prot requirement is relaxed. Gormans preference family was such that the consumers
expenditure function took the form, e(p; u) = a(p)+ub(p), where a and b are homogeneous
degree 1, while Proposition 2 below shows that our family has gross utility of the form
u(x) = h(x) + g(q(x)) where h and q are homogeneous degree 1.
Cournot oligopoly is studied in a rich literature on single-product rms see Vives
(1999, chapter 4) for an overview of existence, uniqueness and comparative statics of
Cournot equilibria. Sometimes a Cournot oligopoly operates as if it maximizes an objec-
tive. Bergstrom and Varian (1985) observe that a symmetric oligopoly maximizes a Ram-
sey objective, while Slade (1994) and Monderer and Shapley (1996) note that oligopolists
sometimes maximize a more abstract potential function. This is useful as it converts
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the xed-point problem of calculating equilibrium quantities into a simpler optimization
problem. In Proposition 1 we extend this analysis to cover multiproduct cases and, like
Bergstrom and Varian (1985), show that oligopolists maximize an appropriate Ramsey
objective.
Weyl and Fabinger (2013) discuss the passthrough of costs to prices and its various
applications in settings of monopoly and imperfect competition with single-product rms.
Within the marketing literature on retailing, a major theme is the extent to which wholesale
cost shocks (such as temporary promotions) are passed through into retail prices. Besanko
et al. (2005) empirically examine the patterns of cost passthrough in a large supermarket
chain. They nd that own-cost proportional passthrough is more than 60% for most
product categories (and sometimes more than 100%), while cross-cost passthrough can
take either sign. Moorthy (2005) analyzes a theoretical model where two retailers compete
to supply two products to consumers, and as well as cost passthrough within a retailer
he discusses how cost shock to the rival a¤ects rms prices. The sign of most of the
passthrough e¤ects depends in an opaque way on the features of various matrices. In
section 3.3, our demand system yields some relatively simple multiproduct passthrough
relationships.
The optimal regulation of multi-product monopoly is analyzed by La¤ont and Tirole
(1993, chapter 3). In their main model, cost outturns are observable but the regulator
cannot observe cost-reducing e¤ort or the rms underlying cost type. If the cost function
is separable between quantities on the one hand and the rms e¤ort and type on the other,
then the incentive-pricing dichotomyholds pricing should not be used to provide e¤ort
incentives. If there is a social cost of public funds, Ramsey pricing is therefore optimal,
as characterized by super-elasticityformulas for markups. The analysis of regulation in
section 3.4 below does not consider e¤ort incentives, but is for the situation studied by
Baron and Myerson (1982) where the regulator cannot observe the rms costs. We extend
this model to cover multiproduct situations where a vector of marginal costs is unobserved
by the regulator. Building on the approach in Armstrong (1996) and Armstrong and
Vickers (2001), we describe a tractable class of situations in which it is optimal to control
only the rms average output, leaving it free to choose relative outputs to reect its relative
costs.
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2 A general analysis of multiproduct pricing
Suppose there are n  2 products, where the quantity of product i is denoted xi and the
vector of quantities is x = (x1; :::; xn). Consumers have quasi-linear utility, which implies
that demand can be considered to be generated by a single representative consumer with
gross utility function u(x) dened on a (full-dimensional) convex region R  Rn+ which
includes zero, where u(0) = 0 and u is increasing and concave. (We might have R = Rn+,
so that utility is dened for all non-negative quantity bundles.) We suppose that u is
twice continuously di¤erentiable in the interior of R, although marginal utility might be
unbounded as some quantities tend to zero.
Faced with price vector p = (p1; :::; pn), the consumer chooses quantities x 2 R to
maximize u(x)   p  x. (Here, a  b  Pni=1 aibi denotes the dot product of two vectors a
and b.) The price vector which induces interior quantity vector x 2 R to be demanded,
i.e., the inverse demand function p(x), is
p(x)  ru(x) ;
where we use the gradient notation rf(x)  (@f(x)=@x1; :::; @f(x)=@xn) for the vector of
partial derivatives of a function f . To ensure we can invert p(x) to obtain the demand
function x(p), assume that the matrix of second derivatives of u, which we write as Dp(x),
is non-singular (and hence negative-denite). The revenue generated from quantity vector
x is
r(x) = x  ru(x) ;
while the surplus retained by the consumer from x is
s(x)  u(x)  r(x) = d
dk
ku(x=k)

k=1
: (1)
One of this papers aims is to show the usefulness of the function s(x) for analyzing mul-
tiproduct pricing.
We next discuss some features of s(x). First, the right-hand side of expression (1) shows
that s() is related to the elasticity of scale of u() evaluated at x, and a more concave u
allows the consumer to retain more surplus.2 Second, the derivative of s can be expressed
as
rs(x) = d
dk
p(x=k)

k=1
; (2)
2If all quantities x are increased by 1 per cent, then u increases by (1  s(x)=u(x)) per cent.
5
so that an equiproportionate contraction in quantities x moves the price vector in the
direction rs(x), i.e., normal to the surface s(x) = constant. To see (2), note that
@
@xi
s(x) =
@
@xi
[u(x)  r(x)] =  
X
j
xj
@
@xi
pj(x) =  
X
j
xj
@
@xj
pi(x) =
d
dk
pi(x=k)

k=1
;
where the third equality follows from the symmetry of cross-derivatives of p(x). Unlike
consumer surplus expressed as a function of prices which is necessarily a decreasing func-
tion of prices here s(x) can increase or decrease with xi.3 From (2), a su¢ cient condition
for s to increase with xi is that pi decrease with all xj, which is the case if products are
gross substitutes (see Vives (1999, section 6.1)). Note, though, that the above expressions
imply that for x 6= 0 we have
d
dk
s(kx)

k=1
=  x Dp(x)  x > 0 ; (3)
where the inequality follows from the matrixDp(x) being negative-denite. Thus consumer
surplus increases as all quantities are increased equiproportionately.
The Ramsey monopoly problem: Now suppose that these products are supplied by a
monopolist with di¤erentiable cost function c(x). To sidestep issues of xed costs and the
potential undesirability of producing at all, both with monopoly and in the later analysis
of Cournot oligopoly, we suppose that
c(0) = 0 and c(x) is convex. (4)
Consider the Ramsey problem of choosing quantities to maximize a weighted sum of prot
and consumer surplus. If   1 is the relative weight on consumer surplus, the Ramsey
objective is
[r(x)  c(x)] + s(x) = u(x)  c(x)  (1  )s(x) : (5)
This includes as polar cases prot maximization ( = 0) and total surplus maximization
( = 1). Standard comparative statics shows that optimal consumer surplus, s(x), in
this Ramsey problem weakly increases with , while optimal prot [r(x)   c(x)] weakly
decreases with . Total surplus is maximized at quantities xw which involve prices equal to
marginal costs, so that p(xw) = rc(xw), and assumption (4) ensures that the rm breaks
3Likewise, while consumer surplus is necessarily convex as a function of prices, even in the single-product
case it is ambiguous whether s(x) is convex or concave (or neither) as a function of quantities.
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even with marginal-cost pricing. More generally, the Ramsey problem with weight  has
rst-order condition for optimal quantities given by
p(x) = rc(x) + (1  )rs(x) : (6)
Thus, when  < 1 the optimal departure of price from marginal cost is proportional to
rs(x). In particular, the Ramsey price for product i is above its marginal cost if surplus
s(x) increases with xi at optimal quantities, while using the product as a loss leaderis
optimal if s(x) decreases with xi. As we will see later, there are also natural cases where
s depends only on the quantities of a subset of products, in which case (6) indicates that
the remaining products should be priced at marginal cost. Thus, the function s succinctly
determines when it is optimal to set a price above, below, or equal to marginal cost.4
When  is close to 1 then choosing x = xw approximately solves the Ramsey problem
(5) when the cost function c(x) is homogeneous degree 1. To see this, note that when
  1 expression (2) implies
p(x)  p(x)  (1  )rs(x) ; (7)
in which case
p(xw)  p(xw) + (1  )rs(xw)
= rc(xw) + (1  )rs(xw)
= rc(xw) + (1  )rs(xw)
 rc(xw) + (1  )rs(xw) ;
so that x = xw approximately satises condition (6). (Here, the rst strict equality
follows from the e¢ ciency of quantities xw while the second follows from the homogeneity
of c().) In sum, in the Ramsey problem with constant returns to scale and   1, the
e¢ cient quantities should be scaled back equiproportionately by the factor .
Without making further assumptions, there is little reason to expect that this insight
for   1 extends to the situation where a monopolist maximizes prot ( = 0), and
in general prot-maximizing quantities are not proportional to e¢ cient quantities. To
4Expression (6) is an alternative and arguably more transparent formulation of the insight in Baumol
and Bradford (1970, section VIII) that the gap between price and marginal cost should be proportional to
the gap between marginal revenue and marginal cost, where marginal revenue takes into account how
increasing the supply of one product a¤ects prices for other products.
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illustrate, the bold curve on Figure 1 depicts Ramsey quantity vectors as the weight on
consumer surplus varies from  = 0 to  = 1.5 As shown, these Ramsey quantities
are the vectors the contract curvebetween consumers and the rm where iso-prot
contours (which are curves centred on prot-maximizing quantities) are tangent to iso-
welfare contours (centred on e¢ cient quantities). As discussed above, when   1 optimal
quantities are approximately proportional to e¢ cient quantities, and so when  = 1 the
bold line is tangent to the dashed ray from the origin.
x1
x2
Figure 1: Ramsey quantities as  varies from 0 to 1
Cournot oligopoly: A natural development of our framework is to the Cournot oligopoly
setting with m symmetric rms that each supply the full range of products and have the
cost function c() satisfying (4). Our main result in this context is that equilibrium in
this m-player game is closely related to an appropriate Ramsey optimum. Assumption (4)
implies that the least-cost way for the industry to supply total quantity vector x is to split
this quantity equally between the m rms so that total cost is mc( 1
m
x). In this case the
Ramsey objective (5) becomes
u(x) mc( 1
m
x)  (1  )s(x) ; (8)
so that the corresponding rst-order condition for the optimal vector of total quantity x is
p(x) = rc( 1
m
x) + (1  )rs(x) : (9)
5The gure depicts for x1; x2  25 the example where u(x) = x1 + x2   13 (x1)3   23 (x2)
3
2 and c(x) = 0.
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Consider a candidate symmetric equilibrium in which each rm supplies quantity vector
1
m
x (so that x is total supply). Then a rm must maximize its prot
(y) = y  p(m 1
m
x+ y)  c(y)
by choosing y = 1
m
x, which from expression (2) has the rst-order condition
p(x) = rc( 1
m
x) + 1
m
rs(x) : (10)
Comparing with (10) with (9) reveals that a symmetric Cournot equilibrium, if it exists, has
the same rst-order conditions as the Ramsey problem (8) when the weight on consumers
is  = m 1
m
.
The following result establishes the existence and symmetry of Cournot equilibrium:
Proposition 1 Suppose there are m Cournot competitors, each of which supplies all n
products and has the same cost function c(x) satisfying (4). Then there exists a sym-
metric Cournot equilibrium in which quantities maximize the Ramsey objective (8) with
 = m 1
m
. There are no asymmetric equilibria. If in addition r(x) is concave there is only
one symmetric equilibrium.
Proof. We rst rule out asymmetric equilibria. Consider a (possibly asymmetric) candi-
date equilibrium in which rm j supplies quantity vector xj, where x = jxj is the total
supply. At an asymmetric equilibrium, at least one rm must have xj 6= 1
m
x. In this
equilibrium rm j must maximize its prot
j(y) = y  p(i 6=jxi + y)  c(y)
by choosing y = xj. In particular, it cannot be protable to deviate from supplying
y = xj to supplying y = xj + "(x mxj), where " is a scalar. Evaluating the derivative of
j(x
j + "(x mxj)) with respect to " at " = 0 therefore yields
0 = [p(x) rc(xj) + xj Dp(x)]  (x mxj)
= [p(x) rc(xj)  1
m
(x mxj   x) Dp(x)]  (x mxj)
 [p(x) rc(xj) + 1
m
x Dp(x)]  (x mxj) ; (11)
where the inequality (11) follows from the negative-deniteness of the matrix Dp(x). This
inequality is strict if xj 6= 1
m
x, which is the case for some rm in an asymmetric equilibrium,
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and so summing (11) across the m rms we obtain
0 >  mP
j
( 1
m
x  xj)  rc(xj)  mP
j
[c(xj)  c( 1
m
x)]  0 ; (12)
which is a contradiction. To see the second inequality in (12), note that the convexity of
c() implies c( 1
m
x)  c(xj)  ( 1
m
x  xj)  rc(xj), while the third inequality in (12) follows
directly from the convexity of c(). We deduce that x cannot be equilibrium supply unless
it is symmetrically shared between rms.
Turning to equilibrium existence, note that the Ramsey objective (8) can be written
(1 )r(x)+u(x) mc( 1
m
x). Suppose that quantity vector x solves this Ramsey problem
when  = m 1
m
. Since c is convex, it follows that choosing xj = 1
m
x for each j maximizes
the function
(1  )r(jxj) + u(jxj)  jc(xj) :
In particular, choosing y = 1
m
x maximizes the function
(y)  1
m
r(m 1
m
x+ y) + m 1
m
u(m 1
m
x+ y)  c(y) .
Now consider Cournot competition and a rms best response when its rivals each supply
quantity vector 1
m
x. This rm chooses its quantity vector y to maximize its prot
(y)  y  p(m 1
m
x+ y)  c(y)
= (y)  m 1
m

u(m 1
m
x+ y) + ( 1
m
x  y)  p(m 1
m
x+ y)
	
 (y)  m 1
m
u(x) ;
where the inequality follows from the concavity of u. Since ( 1
m
x) = ( 1
m
x)  m 1
m
u(x), we
therefore have
( 1
m
x)  (y)  ( 1
m
x)  (y)  0
where the nal inequality follows since y = 1
m
x maximizes (y). We deduce it is a Cournot
equilibrium for each rm to supply 1
m
x.
Finally, consider the uniqueness of equilibrium. We have already shown there are no
asymmetric equilibria, while expression (10) shows that any symmetric equilibrium satises
the rst-order conditions for maximizing the Ramsey objective (8) with  = m 1
m
. This
Ramsey objective can be written as 1
m
r(x)+m 1
m
u(x) mc( 1
m
x), and given that u is strictly
concave and c is convex, this is strictly concave if r(x) is concave. In this case, there is a
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unique quantity vector x which satises the rst-order condition (10), and hence a unique
symmetric equilibrium.
Thus, with symmetric convex cost functions there are no asymmetric Cournot equilibria,
and there exists a symmetric Cournot equilibrium in which total quantities maximize the
Ramsey objective (8) with  = m 1
m
. If revenue r is concave, there is a unique Cournot
equilibrium, which coincides with the (unique) optimum for the Ramsey objective (8)
with  = m 1
m
. In this sense, the Cournot problem and the (appropriately weighted)
Ramsey problem are the same. This generalizes the second remark in Bergstrom and
Varian (1985) that a symmetric single-product Cournot oligopoly can be considered to
maximize a Ramsey objective to the multiproduct context.
When c(x) is homogeneous degree 1, the number of suppliers has no impact on industry
costs and the Ramsey objectives (5) and (8) coincide. In this case, since consumer surplus
in the Ramsey problem (5) increases, and prot decreases, with , we deduce that as the
number of competitors increases, a symmetric Cournot equilibrium delivers more surplus
to consumers and involves lower industry prot, and with many rms the equilibrium
quantities are approximately m 1
m
xw (where xw is the e¢ cient quantity vector). One can
also study how equilibrium prices depend on marginal costs by studying the simple Ramsey
problem, as we do below in section 3.3.
The analysis in Proposition 1 assumes rms are symmetric. Among other issues, this
assumption means one cannot study the impact of rm-specic cost shocks, for instance,
but only industry-wide cost shocks. When Cournot equilibria exist in asymmetric settings
it is straightforward to obtain rst-order conditions for equilibrium prices. For example,
suppose that each rm has constant marginal costs, and rm j has the marginal cost vector
cj = (cj1; :::; c
j
n). Then if all rms supply all products in equilibrium, an argument similar
to (10) shows that equilibrium prices satisfy
p(x) = 1
m
jc
j + 1
m
rs(x) (13)
where 1
m
jc
j is the industry average vector of marginal costs.6 Thus, the Cournot equilib-
rium here corresponds to a the Ramsey optimum with weight on consumers  = m 1
m
and
6This generalizes the rst remark in Bergstrom and Varian (1985) that equilibrium industry output
depends only on the average marginal cost in the industry, not its distribution to multiple products. One
can show that this Cournot equilibrium exists if (i) inverse demands pi(x) are each weakly concave and
(ii) that the cost vectors cj are close enoughthat each rm supplies all products in equilibrium.
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a hypothetical monopolist with cost function c(x) = 1
m
x  [jcj]. Another way to allow for
rm asymmetries is discussed in the following Bertrand model.
Bertrand oligopoly: Although it is not the focus of this paper, consider briey one
way to model Bertrand competition in this framework. Bliss (1988) and Armstrong and
Vickers (2001, section 2) suggested a model where consumers buy all products from one
rm or another, so there is one-stop shopping, and rms therefore compete in terms of
the surplus they o¤er their customers. Each consumer has the same gross utility, u(x),
when they purchase quantity vector x from a rm, and this utility function is the same
at all rms. Firms compete by o¤ering linear prices, so that a consumer obtains surplus
s(x) when they buy quantity x from a rm via linear prices, while rm i, say, obtains
prot r(x)   ci(x) from each customer where ci(x) is this rms constant-returns-to-scale
cost function. (Unlike the previous Cournot model, here it is straightforward to allow
rms to have di¤erent cost functions.) Consumers di¤er in their brand preferences for the
various rms, say due to the distances they must travel to reach them, and the number
of customers a rm attracts increases with the surplus s it o¤ers and decreases with the
surplus its rivals o¤er.
In this framework, each rms strategy can be broken down into two steps: (i) choose
the most protable way to deliver a given surplus to a customer, and (ii) choose how much
surplus to o¤er its customers. Step (i) is just the Ramsey problem as discussed above, and
a rms optimal prices take the form (6) where  now will reect the rms competitive
constraints in step (ii) rather than concern for consumer welfare. In equilibrium there
is intra-rm e¢ ciency, but with cost di¤erences across rms there will not in general be
industry-wide e¢ ciency (i.e., industry prots are not maximized subject to an overall
consumer surplus constraint).
The general analysis in this section has introduced the consumer surplus function s(x)
and shown its usefulness in analyzing the Ramsey monopoly problem and, by extension,
the symmetric Cournot oligopoly problem. In the rest of the paper we develop the analysis
of monopoly and oligopoly by supposing that s is homothetic in x. This specication
includes a number of familiar multiproduct demand systems, and has notably convenient
properties. In particular, the feature of equiproportionate quantity reduction that appeared
locally (for   1 in the Ramsey problem or large m in the Cournot equilibrium) in the
analysis above, holds globally.
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3 A family of demand systems
3.1 Homothetic consumer surplus
The family of demand systems on which we now focus is characterized by the property that
consumer surplus s(x) is a homothetic function of quantities x. We rst describe which
demand systems have this property:
Proposition 2 Consumer surplus s(x) is homothetic in x if and only if utility u(x) can
be written in the form
u(x) = h(x) + g(q(x)) (14)
where h() and q() are homogeneous degree 1 functions and g() is concave with g(0) = 0.
Proof. First, note that we must have g(0) = 0 and g concave in q given that u(0) = 0
and u() is concave in x. (Since u is concave, when u takes the form (14) for given x the
function k ! kh(x) + g(kq(x)) is too, so that g() is concave.)
To show su¢ ciency, note that (14) implies that inverse demand is
p(x) = rh(x) + g0(q(x))rq(x) : (15)
Revenue is therefore
r(x) = x  p(x) = h(x) + g0(q(x))q(x) ; (16)
where we used the fact that xrh(x)  h(x) for a homogenous degree 1 function. Consumer
surplus s(x) is then
s(x) = g(q(x))  g0(q(x))q(x) ; (17)
which is homothetic since s(x) is an increasing function of the homogenous function q(x).
(Since g is concave, g(q)  g0(q)q is an increasing function.)
To show necessity, suppose that consumer surplus s(x) is homothetic, so that s(x) 
G(q(x)) for some increasing function G and some function q(x) which is homogeneous
degree 1. We can write G as G(q)  g(q)  qg0(q) for another function g().7 Then
s(~x=k) = g(q(~x)=k)  q(~x)
k
g0(q(~x)=k) =
d
dk
kg(q(~x)=k) : (18)
7Given any function G(), one can generate the corresponding g() using the procedure
g(q) =  q
Z q
[G(~q)=~q2]d~q :
This function g(q) is concave given that G(q) is increasing.
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Note that (1) can be generalized slightly so that s(~x=k) = d
dk
ku(~x=k), and so (18) can be
integrated to yield
ku(~x=k) = h(~x) + kg(q(~x)=k)
for some constant of integration h(~x). Writing x = ~x=k this becomes
u(x) =
h(kx)
k
+ g(q(x)) :
Since this holds for all k we deduce that u(x) = h(x)+g(q(x)), where h(x) is homogeneous
degree 1.
This result implies that the set of demand systems in which consumer surplus is
homothetic in quantities is broader than that where consumer surplus is homothetic in
prices. Expressed as a function of prices, consumer surplus is the convex function v(p) =
maxx0fu(x)   p  xg. Duality implies that u(x) can be recovered from v(p) using the
procedure u(x) = minp0fv(p) + p  xg, and if v(p) is homothetic in p then u(x) =
minp0fv(p)+p xg is homothetic in x. Thus, the utility functions such that consumer sur-
plus is homothetic in prices are simply the homothetic utility functions, i.e., where h  0
in (14), which is a subset of the family of preferences we study. In section 3.2 we discuss
familiar instances of the family (14) which do not have homothetic u().
For the remainder of the paper we assume that utility u(x), as well as being increas-
ing and concave, can be written in the form (14). Some immediate observations on this
preference specication are:
 For a specic utility function u(x) it may not be obvious a priori whether it accords
with the form (14). However, Proposition 2 implies that this is the case whenever
consumer surplus, s(x)  u(x)   x  ru(x), is homothetic, which in practice is easy
to check.
 Expression (15) implies that an equiproportionate change in quantities moves the
price vector along a straight line in the direction rq(x). In geometric terms, then,
quantity vectors on the ray joining x to the origin correspond to price vectors which
lie on the straight line starting at p(x) pointing in the direction rq(x).
 If u satises (14), then the modied environment in which a subset of these products
are removed also satises (14). That is, if a subset of products have quantities xi set
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equal to zero, the utility function u dened on the remaining products continues to
satisfy (14).
 Since g is concave, the function g(q)   g0(q)q in (17) is an increasing function, so
surplus s increases with xi and the Ramsey price for product i is above marginal
cost in (6) if and only if q() increases with xi.
 When utility takes the form (14), the revenue function (16) takes a similar form, with
the same h and q (but with qg0(q) replacing g(q)). For this reason, a multiproduct
monopolists problem of maximizing prot discussed below in section 3.3 is closely
connected to the consumers problem of maximizing surplus, where prices in the
consumers problem correspond to marginal costs in the rms problem.
 There are three degrees of freedom when choosing a demand system within the class
q(x), h(x) and g(q) and expression (14) provides a useful toolkit for constructing
tractable multiproduct demand systems with particular desired properties. For this
purpose it is useful to know conditions for the resulting utility function u to be
concave. Su¢ cient conditions to ensure that u in (14) is concave are that h and g
are concave and either: (i) q is concave and g is increasing; (ii) q is convex and g is
decreasing, or (iii) q is linear in x (which allows g to be non-monotonic).
For the remainder of this subsection we discuss in more detail the implications of this
utility specication for the corresponding demand system, denoted x(p). Given prices p,
the consumer with utility (14) can maximize her surplus with a simple two-step procedure.
We can write quantities x in the form
x  q(x) x
q(x)
: (19)
Here, x=q(x) is homogeneous degree zero and depends only on the ray from the origin on
which x lies, while q(x) is homogeneous degree 1 and measures how far along that ray x
lies, and so the decomposition (19) represents a generalized form of polar coordinates
for the quantity vector x. (The coordinate x=q(x) lies on the (n  1)-dimensional surface
q  1.) Henceforth we refer to q(x) as compositequantity and x=q(x) as the relative
quantities.
We know already that (maximized) consumer surplus, s(x), depends on x only via
composite quantity q(x). More generally, consumer surplus with arbitrary quantities x
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and prices p can be written in terms of the coordinates in (19) as
h(x) + g(q(x))  p  x = g(q(x))  q(x)p  x  h(x)
q(x)
: (20)
(Since the function p  x   h(x) is homogeneous degree 1, (p  x   h(x))=q(x) depends
only on the relative quantities x=q(x).) Since consumer surplus in (20) is decreasing in
(p  x  h(x))=q(x), the consumer should choose relative quantities to minimize this term,
regardless of her choice for composite quantity. Therefore, write
(p)  min
x0
:
p  x  h(x)
q(x)
; (21)
which is an increasing and concave function of p. The envelope theorem implies that its
derivative is the optimal choice of relative quantities, so if we write x(p)  r(p) the
consumer facing prices p chooses relative quantities x(p).8
Given the relative quantities, x(p), the optimal choice of composite quantity, say Q, is
easily derived. Consumer surplus in (20) with the optimal relative quantities is the concave
function g(Q) Q(p). Write Q^() for the composite quantity which maximizes g(Q) Q,
which is necessarily weakly downward-sloping, so that Q^((p)) is the demand for composite
quantity given the price vector p. Price vectors with the same (p) induce the consumer
to choose the same composite quantity Q, and so (p) is the composite price which
corresponds to composite quantity q(x). Since the consumer chooses relative quantities
x(p) and composite quantity Q^((p)), from (19) the vector of quantities demanded at
prices p is
x(p) = Q^((p)) x(p) : (22)
Here, the function g() determines the shape the composite demand function Q^(), while
the functions h() and q() combine to determine the form of composite price function ().
Expression (22) implies that cross or own-price demand e¤ects are
@xi
@pj
= Q^()ij + Q^
0()ij : (23)
(Here, recall that x(p) = r(p), while subscripts to  denote its partial derivatives.)
This is akin to the Slutsky Equation from classical demand theory. The rst term in
(23) represents the substitution e¤ect while staying on the same composite quantity (or
8There is a unique vector of relative quantities which solves (21) provided that h and q are quasi-concave
with one or both of them strictly so.
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consumer surplus) contour, and the second term represents the impact of a price rise on
the composite quantity demanded. This second term is negative, while the rst term is
negative if j = i and could be positive or negative when j 6= i. For instance, if utility is
homothetic then (p) is positive and homogenous degree 1, and expression (23) has the
sign of
ij
ij
   Q^0()
Q^()
. Here the rst term is the elasticity of substitution of demand and
the second term is the elasticity of composite demand, and the relative sizes of these two
elasticities determines the sign of cross-price e¤ects.
Since inverse demand p(x) in (15) induces demand x, it follows that
p = rh(x) + g0(Q)rq(x)) x(p) = Q x
q(x)
: (24)
In particular, for xed Q any price vector of the form p = rh(x) + g0(Q)rq(x) induces
the same composite demand Q, and hence the same consumer surplus s = g(Q) Qg0(Q)
and composite price (p) = g0(Q). Conversely, since demand x(p) induces inverse demand
p, substituting (22) into the expression for inverse demand (15), and recalling that for
positive demand we have g0(Q^())  , reveals that
p  rh(x(p)) + (p)rq(x(p)) : (25)
(Alternatively, this expression is the rst-order condition for problem (21).) Expression (25)
is the analogue for prices of the change of coordinates for quantities in (19), and decomposes
the price vector p into composite price, (p), and relative priceswhich in this context we
dene to be x(p), i.e., the relative quantities which are optimal with prices p. From (24),
prices which induce relative quantities x lie on the straight line  : 7! rh(x) + rq(x),
which is not necessarily a ray from the origin, while the coordinate (p) determines how
far along such a line the price vector lies.
3.2 Special cases
If u() is itself homothetic for instance, if demand takes the familiar CES form then
(14) is trivially satised by setting h  0. In this case, expression (21) implies that (p)
is homogeneous degree 1, and x(p) = r(p) is homogeneous degree zero. More generally,
homothetic demand is an instance of the subclass of (14) where h takes the linear form
h(x) = a  x, when  in (21) is a function that is homogenous degree 1 in the adjusted
price vector (p  a).
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Linear demand: Another instance of this subclass with linear h() is linear demand,
where utility u(x) takes the quadratic form
u(x) = a  x  1
2
x M  x (26)
for constant vector a > 0 and (symmetric) positive-denite matrix M . Here, inverse
demands are p(x) = a   Mx, and utility takes the form (14) by writing h(x) = a  x,
q(x) =
p
x M  x and g(q) =  1
2
q2. Here, rq(x) = Mx and so expression (24) implies
that the set of price vectors which correspond to the same relative quantities takes the
form p = a  tM  x for scalar t, which are rays originating from the vector of choke prices
a. It may be that q(x) and therefore s(x) decrease with xi when o¤-diagonal elements of
M are negative (which corresponds to products being complements).
Logit demand: Suppose that consumer demand takes the logit form
xi(p) =
eai pi
1 +
P
j e
aj pj ; (27)
where a = (a1; :::; an) is a constant vector. It follows that inverse demand is
pi(x) = ai   log xi
1  q(x) ; (28)
where q(x) Pj xj is total quantity. This inverse demand function (28) integrates to give
the utility function
u(x) = a  x P
j
xj log xj   (1  q(x)) log (1  q(x)) :
(As with any demand system resulting from discrete choice, the utility function is only
dened on the domain ixi  1.9) This utility can be written in the required form (14) as
u(x) = a  x+P
i
xi log
q(x)
xi| {z }
h(x)
+ g(q(x)) : (29)
Here, h(x) as labelled is homogenous degree 1, as is total output q(x), while g(q) is equal
to the entropy function g(q) =  q log q  (1  q) log(1  q), which is concave in 0  q  1.
Since g0(q) = log(1  q)  log q, demand for composite quantity as a function of composite
9If one wishes only to consider non-negative prices, from (28) one should further restrict attention to
quantity vectors which satisfy xi  (1  jxj)eai for i = 1; :::; n.
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price takes the logistic form.10 With logit, as with homogeneous goods, consumer surplus
is a function only of total quantity, and product di¤erentiation is reected separately in the
h(x) term. Since rq(x)  (1; :::; 1), the set of prices which correspond to the same relative
quantities takes the form p + (t; :::; t), as can be seen directly from (27). This contrasts
with the subclass with linear h(x), where these lines were not parallel but emanated from
a point. More generally, with any demand system in the subclass with linear q(x) = b  x,
the set of prices which correspond to quantity vectors on a given ray from the origin take
the form of parallel straight lines.
Systems of strictly complementary products: A common situation is where con-
sumers purchase a single unit of a base product, and then combine this with variable
quantities of one or more complementary products. For instance, a consumer may need
to gain entry to a theme park before they can go on the rides (Oi, 1971), or needs to buy
a printer along with a suitable quantity of ink in order to print. To illustrate how these
situations sometimes t into our framework, suppose there is a continuum of consumers
indexed by scalar , where the type- consumer has gross utility U(y) +  if she consumes
quantity y of the combined service. (The following discussion also applies if y is a vector of
multiple services.) Adding over the population of consumers implies that aggregate gross
utility if x1 consumers (those with the highest value of ) each consume quantity y of
combined service takes the form x1U(y) + g(x1) for some increasing concave function g(),
where g is determined by the distribution of . If x2 denotes the quantity of combined
service across all consumers, so that x2 = x1y, it follows that aggregate utility in terms of
the quantity vector (x1; x2) is
u(x1; x2) = x1U(x2=x1) + g(x1) : (30)
Clearly, this utility function ts into our family (14), where h(x) = x1U(x2=x1) and com-
posite quantity is just q(x) = x1. This is another instance of the subclass with linear
q(x), but here s(x) is a function only of x1, the number of active consumers. The set of
prices which correspond to the same relative quantities i.e., the same usage per active
consumer are horizontal lines with p2 constant.
10Anderson et al. (1988) have previously noted the connection between logit demand and entropy. The
entropy function makes it di¢ cult to obtain closed-form solutions for optimal prices or quantities with
logit demand. However, if we modify (29) slightly so that g(q) / q(1  q), demand for composite quantity
is linear rather than logistic and explicit formulas can be obtained.
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3.3 Analysis
In this section we discuss how to maximize welfare and prot, as well as calculate oligopoly
outcomes, when the demand system satises (14) and the cost function satises
c(x) is convex and homogeneous degree 1. (31)
Consider again the problem of maximizing a weighted sum of prot and consumer surplus.
If 0    1 is the relative weight on consumer surplus, the Ramsey objective (5) is
[r(x)  c(x)] + s(x) = g(q(x)) + (1  )g0(q(x))q(x)  q(x)c(x)  h(x)
q(x)
: (32)
Here, we used the formulas (16)-(17).
As with the consumers problem in section 3.1, the Ramsey problem can conveniently
be solved by means of the change of variables (19). Expression (32) shows how the Ramsey
objective can be written in terms of composite quantity q(x) and the relative quantities
x=q(x). Expression (32) is decreasing in the term (c(x)   h(x))=q(x), and so relative
quantities should be chosen to minimize this term. As in (21), write
 = min
x0
:
c(x)  h(x)
q(x)
; (33)
which is solved by choosing relative quantities x = x, say. (Since the quantity vector
which minimizes (33) is indeterminate up to a scaling factor, as in section 3.1 we normalize
x so that q(x) = 1.11) We deduce that maximizing any Ramsey objective involves
choosing the same relative quantities x, in contrast to the case depicted in Figure 1. In
particular, prot-maximizing quantities ( = 0) are proportional to the e¢ cient quantities
corresponding to marginal-cost pricing ( = 1). That is, the unregulated rm has an
incentive to choose its relative quantities in an e¢ cient manner, and the sole ine¢ ciency
arises from it supplying too little composite quantity.
Given this choice for relative quantities, the optimal choice for composite quantity Q
is easily derived. Expression (32) with relative quantities x is the function
g(Q) + (1  )g0(Q)Q  Q : (34)
11There is a unique vector of relative quantities which solves (33) provided that (c h) is quasi-convex and
q is quasi-concave with one of them strictly so. To illustrate this analysis, suppose that q(x1; x2) =
p
x1x2,
h(x1; x2) = 0 and c(x1; x2) =
p
c21x
2
1 + c
2
2x
2
2. Then one can check that x
 = ( c2c1 ;
c1
c2
) and  =
p
2c1c2.
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(A su¢ cient condition for (34) to be concave in Q for all  is that composite revenue
g0(Q)Q be concave.) The vector of quantities which solves the Ramsey problem is then
Qx, where Q maximizes expression (34). The optimal composite quantity Q increases
with  and decreases with , and satises the Lerner formula
g0(Q)  
g0(Q)
= (1  )(Q) ; (35)
where
(Q)   Qg
00(Q)
g0(Q)
(36)
is the elasticity of inverse demand for composite quantity.
Since relative quantities are the same in all Ramsey problems, so too are relative price-
cost margins. As discussed in section 3.1, this is because an equiproportionate reduction in
e¢ cient quantities causes the price vector to move in a straight line away from the vector
of marginal costs. In more detail, the optimal quantities for the Ramsey problem are Qx,
where Q satises (35), and in particular let the composite quantity which maximizes total
surplus (i.e., when  = 1) be denoted Qw, so that g0(Qw) = . Then the price-cost margins
in the Ramsey problem with composite quantity Q are
p(Qx) rc(Qx) = p(Qx) rc(Qwx)
= p(Qwx) rc(Qwx) + [g0(Q)  g0(Qw)]rq(x)
= [g0(Q)  ]rq(x) : (37)
(Here, the rst equality follows fromrc being homogeneous degree zero, the second follows
from (15), and the nal equality follows since prices equal marginal costs and g0 =  when
Q = Qw.) These margins are proportional to rq(x), and shrink equiproportionately when
Q is larger. Product i is used as a loss leader, in the sense that its price is below marginal
cost, in each Ramsey problem when composite quantity q decreases with xi at x.
By virtue of the Ramsey-Cournot result in Proposition 1, these properties extend to
symmetric Cournot oligopoly. To summarise:
Proposition 3 Suppose that utility takes the form (14) and cost takes the form (31). As
more weight is placed on consumer surplus in the Ramsey problem, the composite quan-
tity increases, the composite price decreases, each individual quantity increases equipropor-
tionately, and each price-cost margin contracts equiproportionately. The same is true in
symmetric Cournot equilibrium as the number of rms increases.
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An important special case involves constant marginal costs, so that c(x)  c  x for
a constant vector of marginal costs c = (c1; :::; cn). In this case,  in (33) is simply (c)
where the function () is dened in (21), while x = x(c). In this context, consider
how optimal prices relate to the rms costs. This analysis is most transparent using the
change of variables for prices (and costs) in (25), so that (p) is the composite price and
x(p) are relative prices (and similarly for the cost vector). As discussed earlier, in any
Ramsey problem it is optimal to choose relative quantities equal to the relative quantities
which correspond to e¢ cient marginal-cost pricing. This immediately implies that it is
optimal to choose relative prices equal to the rms relative costs, so that x(p) = x(c).
The optimal markup of composite price over composite cost is then given by (35), and
the optimal composite price, (p), decreases with the weight on consumer surplus, , and
increases with composite cost, (c).12
What does this mean for price-cost relationships: how does pi depend on cj? Expres-
sions (35) and (37) imply that optimal prices satisfy
p  c = (1  )(Q)g0(Q)rq(x(c)) : (38)
Consider rst the subclass where h takes the linear form h(x) = a  x. Since optimal
quantities are Qx(c), expression (15) shows that prices satisfy
p  a = g0(Q)rq(x(c)) : (39)
Putting (38) and (39) together implies that
p  c = (1  )(Q)
1  (1  )(Q)  (c  a) : (40)
In particular, when preferences are homothetic, so that a = 0, we obtain the familiar result
that proportional price-cost markups are the same across products.
In the iso-elastic case where  is constant, expression (40) implies that the optimal
price for product i depends only on ci, not on any other products cost, and so there is
no cross-cost passthrough in prices, even though there may be substantial cross-price
e¤ects in the demand system. Moreover, provided that the consumer can obtain positive
12Since the prot-maximizing rms choice of composite quantity falls with (c), and since consumer
surplus, s, is an increasing function of composite quantity, we deduce that the rm necessarily o¤ers a
lower level of consumer surplus when unit cost ci increases. Our family of demand systems therefore
excludes the possibility explored by Edgeworth (1925) that imposing a linear tax on a product supplied
by a multiproduct monopolist could reduce all of its prices.
22
utility with a subset of products (e.g., if  > 0 in the CES specication), the optimal price
for one product is una¤ected if the rm is restricted to o¤er a subset of products (or even
just that product).13 For instance, if u is homothetic and g(Q) = 1

Q, where 0 <  < 1,
then   1   and (40) implies that the most protable prices (i.e.,when  = 0) are
p =
1

c :
Likewise, with linear demand we have    1 and expression (40) implies that the prot-
maximizing prices are14
p = 1
2
(a+ c) : (41)
More generally within this subclass with linear h, expression (40) and the fact that the
most protable Q decreases with each cost implies that all cross-cost passthrough terms
for pi have the same sign as (ai   ci)0(Q).15
Alternatively, consider the subclass where composite quantity takes the linear form
q(x) = b  x. Then (38) implies that
p  c = (1  )(Q)g0(Q) b : (42)
In the example with complementary products where utility is (30) and b = (1; 0), this
expression implies there is marginal-cost pricing for usage (p2 = c2), and in particular
changes in c1 have no impact on p2. However, there is cross-cost passthrough in the other
direction: since the optimal Q decreases with both costs, it follows that p1 increases or
decreases with c2 according to whether (Q)g0(Q) decreases or increases with Q. In the
logit example utility is (29) and b = (1; :::; 1), so the price-cost margin pi ci is the same for
13Shugan and Desiraju (2001) discuss these points in the context of linear demand with two products.
In the context of product line pricing, Johnson and Myatt (2015) explore when it is that a rms optimal
price for one product variant can be calculated by supposing that the rm only supplies that variant.
(They consider both monopoly and Cournot settings.)
14It usually makes sense only to consider non-negative quantities, in which case (41) is only valid if a
and c are such that the optimal quantities, x = 12M
 1  (a   c), are positive. In the case of substitutes,
where the matrix M necessarily has all non-negative elements, a necessary condition for this is that each
ai  ci. (When M has all non-negative elements, the operation x 7! Mx takes Rn+ into itself.) However,
with complements, it is possible to have all xi positive and some ai   ci negative. In such cases, (41)
indicates that pi < ci for those products with ai < ci.
15One can analyze how the optimal quantity supplied of one product is a¤ected by cost changes to
other products in a similar manner to the consumer demand expression (23). For instance, since prot-
maximizing quantities satisfy the rst-order conditionrr(x) = c, where c is the vector of constant marginal
costs, there will be a dependence of one products supply on another products cost unless r(x) is additively
separable in quantities, which is (essentially) only the case if demand for one product does not depend on
other prices.
23
each product i, and the common markup (1 )(Q)g0(Q) = (1 )=(1 Q), increases with
Q < 1. Since the optimal Q decreases with each ci, it follows that cross-cost passthrough
is negative and one products price decreases with each other products cost.
As shown in Proposition 1, with m rms each with a cost function satisfying (31) the
outcome with Cournot oligopoly coincides with the Ramsey optimum, provided we set the
weight on consumer interests in the Ramsey problem equal to  = m 1
m
. With our demand
system (14), then, expression (35) implies that equilibrium composite quantity satises
g0(Q)  
g0(Q)
=
1
m
(Q) ;
and Proposition 3 has the corollary that as the number of competitors increases composite
quantity increases, composite price decreases, each individual quantity increases equipro-
portionately, and each price-cost margin contracts equiproportionately. In addition, when
c(x) = c  x and h(x) = a  x, expression (40) implies that
p  c = (Q)
m  (Q)  (c  a) : (43)
As in the Ramsey problem, cross-cost passthrough terms for product i have the same sign
as (ai   ci)0(Q). (Here, a change in one products cost is assumed to be industry-wide,
not rm-specic.) So if (Q) is constant, then the equilibrium price for one product does
not depend on the costs of other products, and nor is one products price a¤ected when
only a subset of products is supplied by the industry.
Firm-specic cost shocks can be analyzed using expression (13). Thus, provided each
rm supplies all products in equilibrium, when h(x) = a  x expression (43) continues to
apply provided that the vector c is interpreted to be the industry average vector of marginal
costs. To illustrate, with linear demand the equilibrium price for product i with m rms is
pi =
1
m+1
 
ai + jc
j
i

;
where cji is rm js cost for product i. Thus an increase in cost c
j
i will be passed through
at rate 1
m+1
to product is price and will have no impact on prices for other products.
3.4 Regulation with asymmetric information about costs
When the demand system falls within the family (14), we have seen that the unregulated
monopolist will choose an e¢ cient pattern of relative quantities, even though it supplies too
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little composite quantity. This suggests that, in some circumstances at least, the optimal
way to regulate market power when the rm has private information about its costs is to
control only its composite quantity, leaving it free to choose relative quantities to reect
its private information.
To explore this issue, we consider optimal regulation of multiproduct monopoly by ex-
tending the analysis of the single-product case by Baron and Myerson (1982). Specically,
there is common knowledge about the demand system, which we assume satises (14), but
the rm has private information about its costs. In particular, suppose the rm has the
vector of constant marginal costs, c = (c1; :::; cn). Optimal regulation can be analyzed by
way of a directscheme whereby the rm reports its cost vector, say ~c, to the regulator,
and conditional on this report the rm is instructed to supply a vector of quantities X and
receives a net transfer T funded by consumers (in addition to the usual revenue r(X)).
The revelation principle implies that we can restrict attention to mechanisms in which the
rm is given an incentive to report its cost vector truthfully, so that ~c = c. The regulator
places weight 0    1 on prot relative to consumer surplus, where prot includes the
transfer T and consumer surplus includes the deduction for the transfer T .
Expression (25) implies we can decompose the cost vector c into composite costs, (c),
and relative costs, x(c), so that c = rh(x(c))+(c)rq(x(c)). From this perspective, the
rm reports its private cost information in terms of coordinates (~; ~x), and conditional on
this report the regulator instructs it to supply composite quantity Q and relative quantities
x.
It is useful to study rst the situation where the coordinate x(c) can be directly
observed by the regulator, before considering the more realistic situation where it is not.16
If the regulator knows the rms costs satisfy x(c) = x, say, then (25) implies that the
cost vector lies on the straight linerh(x)+rq(x), where  denotes the rms composite
cost, (c). However, the regulator does not know where on this line the cost vector lies,
and so needs to solve a one-dimensional screening problem. The following result describes
optimal regulation in this situation, which adapts by-now standard arguments in Baron
16This approach is similar to that in Armstrong (1996, section 4.4) and Armstrong and Vickers (2001,
Proposition 5), where a multidimensional screening problem is solved by supposing that the principal
can observe all-but-one dimension of the agents private information, and then nding conditions which
ensure that the incentive scheme o¤ered to these group of agents does not actually depend on the observed
parameters.
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and Myerson (1982, section 3) to our multiproduct context.17 (The proof of this result is
in the appendix to this paper.)
Lemma 1 Suppose the regulator knows the rms cost vector satises x(c) = x and
believes the rms composite cost  = (c) has cumulative distribution function F ( j x)
and associated density function f( j x). Provided (44) weakly increases with , optimal
regulation requires the rm with composite cost  to supply the composite quantity, Q^((p)),
corresponding to the composite price
(p) = + (1  )F ( j x
)
f( j x) (44)
and to supply the e¢ cient relative quantities x.
This result shows that relative quantities are not distorted from the e¢ cient relative
quantities, x, while if  < 1 expression (44) shows that composite price is above composite
cost, and hence that composite quantity is below the e¢ cient level, in order to reduce the
rent enjoyed by the rm. Although the result is expressed as the rm being required to
o¤er e¢ cient relative quantities, it is clear that the rm would anyway choose to do this if
it had discretion to choose relative quantities.
Consider now the more natural case where the regulator cannot observe x(c). In
general, with current techniques this seems to be an intractable problem. However, in
the special case where the distribution for c is such that (c) and x(c) are independent
random variables, the previous result provides the solution:
Proposition 4 Suppose the distribution for c is such that (c) and x(c) are stochastically
independent, where the rms composite cost  = (c) has cumulative distribution function
F () and associated density function f(). Provided (45) weakly increases with , optimal
regulation requires the rm with composite cost  to supply the composite quantity, Q^((p)),
corresponding to the composite price
(p) = + (1  )F ()
f()
(45)
and to supply the e¢ cient relative quantities x(c).
17Baron and Myerson also show how to solve the problem when (44) is not increasing. Sappington
(1983) solves a distinct multiproduct regulation problem with scalar private information, where the rm
can a¤ect the balance between xed and variable costs.
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Proof. If the two cost coordinates are independent, the regulation of composite quantity
in Lemma 1 does not depend on x(c). (Not only is the required composite quantity
independent of x(c) in (44), but so is the associated transfer function T () in expression
(53) in the appendix.) Consider therefore the regulatory scheme in which, if the rm
reports its composite cost is  and its relative costs are ~x, it is instructed to supply the
composite quantity corresponding to the composite price (45), it is instructed to supply
relative quantities ~x, and it receives the transfer T () in (53). For any given report ,
then, the rm will choose its report ~x to maximize its prot. As in section 3.3 this is
always achieved by minimizing (33), so that the rm reports its true relative costs x(c).
By construction, this policy therefore implements the optimal policy when the regulator
could observe x(c) directly, and so the policy must also be optimal when the regulator
cannot observe x(c) directly.
This optimal scheme gives an incentive for the rm to supply higher composite quantity,
but does not attempt to inuence its choice of relative quantities.18 Intuitively, when (c)
and x(c) are stochastically independent the rm is always happy for the regulator to
observe its relative cost parameter x(c) but not its composite cost (c). That is, for a
given composite quantity, the rm and the regulator have aligned preferences with respect
to the choice of relative quantities. The regulator gains by delegating to the rm the
choice of relative quantities, to enable the rm to make use of its private information
about relative costs, and it does this by using a transfer scheme which depends only on
the composite quantity supplied. However, if (c) and x(c) are correlated, observing the
rms relative costs x(c) is informative about the rms composite cost (c), which gives
the rm an incentive to mis-report its relative costs as well as its composite cost.
To illustrate Proposition 4, suppose that there are two products and utility takes the
additive form u(x) =
p
x1 +
p
x2, which can be written as (14) with h = 0, q(x) = p
x1 +
p
x2
2
and g(Q) =
p
Q. In this case (33) implies
 = (c) =
1
1
c1
+ 1
c2
; (46)
while x(c) = (( c2
c1+c2
)2; ( c1
c1+c2
)2) depends only on the cost ratio c1
c2
. Thus the method
requires that the distribution for (c1; c2) be such that 1c1 +
1
c2
and c1
c2
are independent
18Note that when  = 1, so that the regulator cares only about unweighted surplus, expression (44)
implies that Q does not depend on x regardless of the distribution for c. In this case, it is optimal to set
prices equal to marginal costs for all rms, as discussed in Loeb and Magat (1979).
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variables. Since the sum and ratio of two i.i.d. exponential variables are independent,
the method works if each ci is an independent draw from a distribution such that 1=c is
exponentially distributed.19 Specically, suppose that each ci has support [0;1) and CDF
Pr fc  tg = e  1t . Then 1= is the sum of two exponential variables and so  has CDF
F () = (1 + 1

)e 
1
 and corresponding density f() = 1
3
e 
1
 . Expression (45) then implies
that optimal composite price for the type- rm is  + (1   )2(1 + ), which increases
with  as required, and (52) then implies that the optimal individual prices are
pi = ci [1 + (1  )(1 + )] (47)
where  is the function of c given by (46).20
In expression (47) there is marginal-cost pricing for those rms with  = 0, and so
pi = ci whenever the other product has minimum cost cj = 0. The regulated price for one
product is an increasing function of the other products cost, even though this demand
system has no cross-price e¤ects and there is no statistical correlation in costs across
products. Note also that all types of rm participate in the mechanism, and unlike in
Armstrong (1996, section 3) there is no exclusion in the optimal scheme. However, so
long as  < 1, when the rm has high costs the prices in (47) are above the unregulated
prot-maximizing prices (which with this demand system are pi = 2ci), a possibility that
was noted in the single-product context by Baron and Myerson (1982, page 292).
Similar analysis could be applied in the alternative situation with price-cap regulation,
when transfer payments to the rm are not feasible and instead the regulator species the
set of quantity (or price) vectors from which the rm is permitted to choose. If, hypotheti-
cally, the regulator could observe the rms relative costs x(c), but not its composite cost
(c), it could calculate the optimal set of quantity vectors from which the rm can select,
which plausibly will all be proportional to the e¢ cient pattern x(c).21 In this case, the
regulator can let the iso-x rms choose from a set of composite quantities, and let the
rm choose its pattern of relative quantities freely. When (c) and x(c) are stochastically
19Another way to describe this distribution is that ci comes from an inverse-2 distribution with 2
degrees of freedom.
20Another example which works nicely is when h = 0 and q(x) =
p
x1x2, so that (c) = 2
p
c1c2. In
this case Proposition 4 applies when the distribution for (c1; c2) is such that the product c1c2 and the
ratio c1=c2 are stochastically independent, which is the case when each ci is an independent draw from a
log-normal distribution.
21It is possible that it is optimal to leave gaps in the set of permitted quantities. Even in the sim-
pler single-product case, Alonso and Matouschek (2008) and Amador and Bagwell (2014) show how the
regulator sometimes chooses to leave gaps in the set of permitted prices.
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independent, it follows that the permitted set of composite quantities does not depend on
x(c), and this set of composite quantities then constitutes the optimal price-cap scheme.
4 Conclusions
In this paper we have studied a range of multiproduct pricing questions in terms of con-
sumer surplus considered as a function of quantities. With a monopolist, this is the classical
prot-maximization problem, or more generally the Ramsey problem of welfare maximiza-
tion subject to a prot constraint. With oligopoly, by contrast, the multiproduct pricing
question is one of equilibrium among independent rms, not optimization by a single
decision-maker. We have shown, however, that in perhaps the most natural multiprod-
uct oligopoly model, with symmetric Cournot rms, there is Ramsey-Cournot equivalence.
With suitable welfare weights as between prot and consumer surplus, Ramsey quanti-
ties are Cournot equilibrium quantities, and vice versa. Solutions to Ramsey optimization
problems are therefore equilibrium solutions too.
The other main aim of the paper has been to show how multiproduct monopoly analysis
is made simpler when consumer surplus is a homothetic function of quantities. Whether
the rms objective is prot or a Ramsey combination of prot and consumer surplus, it
optimizes by selecting e¢ cient (i.e., welfare-maximizing) quantities scaled back equipropor-
tionately. The resulting optimal markups yield, for example, transparent results on mul-
tiproduct cost passthrough, including instances of without cross-cost passthrough. With
Ramsey-Cournot equivalence, these results extend to the Cournot oligopoly setting with
symmetric rms.
The family of demand systems with consumer surplus a homothetic function of quan-
tities is of course restrictive. But it includes a number of familiar yet diverse special cases,
including CES and linear demands and discrete choice models such as logit. Moreover,
it shows how those special cases are themselves instances of wider sub-classes of demand
systems, involving h(x)  0, linear h(x) and linear q(x) respectively.
Finally, the family of demand systems analyzed in this paper provides a natural basis
on which to explore the intuition that regulation of multiproduct monopoly should focus
on the general level of prices and not the pattern of relative prices. Indeed we showed how
that intuition can sometimes be precisely correct, thereby contributing to the theory of
multi-dimensional screening.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1: Given x, suppose the regulators additional transfer to the rm
when the latter reports its composite cost ~ is denoted T (~) and its required quantity
vector is X(~). If the rms true composite cost is  = (c), from (25) its cost vector
is c = rh(x) + rq(x). The type- rms maximum prot from participating in this
scheme is therefore
() = max
~
: T (~) + r(X(~)) X(~)  [rh(x) + rq(x)] ; (48)
and it is willing to participate provided that ()  0. Here, prot in (48) satises the
envelope condition
0() =  X()  rq(x) ; (49)
where the right-hand side of (49) is evaluated at the rms true cost  since we are consid-
ering truthful mechanisms.
If the support of the distribution for  for this iso-x group of rms is [min; max],
expected welfare under the scheme isZ max
min
(u(X())  r(X(~))  T (X()) + ()) f( j x)d
=
Z max
min
(u(X()) X()  [rh(x) + rq(x)]  (1  )()) f( j x)d ; (50)
where the equality follows after substituting for r + T in (48). The regulator wishes to
maximize (50) subject to the participation and incentive constraints of the rm. We solve
this by solving a relaxed problem in which only the participation constraint for the
highest- rm is considered and where only the local incentive constraints captured by
(49) are considered. (We then check ex post that the remaining constraints are satised.)
Proof. Given (49) and (max) = 0, integrating the term
R
fd by parts implies that
(50) can be written asZ max
min

u(X()) X() 

rh(x) +

+ (1  )F ( j x
)
f( j x)

rq(x)

f( j x)d :
(51)
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This expression can then be maximized pointwise with respect to the vector X(). Since
consumer demand at price vector p maximizes u(x) p x, it follows that X() is consumer
demand corresponding to the price vector
p = rh(x) +

+ (1  )F ( j x
)
f( j x)

rq(x) : (52)
Expression (24) and its subsequent discussion then implies that the price vector (52) sat-
ises (44), and the composite quantity Q corresponding to this price vector maximizes
g(Q) Q(p), or in the notation from section 3.1 composite quantity is Q^((p)). Expres-
sion (24) also implies that the relative quantities corresponding to prices (52) are just x
for each .
At this candidate solution with quantities X() = Q^((p)) x, 0() in (49) is equal
to  Q^((p))  0 and so  is weakly decreasing in  and the participation constraint is
satised for all  given it is satised for max. Since  in (48) is necessarily convex in ,
incentive compatibility requires that 0 in (49) be weakly increasing in , which is the case
provided that (44) is weakly increasing. Standard arguments (see Lemma 1 in Baron and
Myerson) show that it is also su¢ cient for incentive compatibility that 0 in (49) weakly
increase with . For reference later, it is useful to note that the corresponding incentive
payment T () can be calculated from (48) and (49) to be
T () =
Z max

Q^

~+ (1  )F (~ j x
)
f(~ j x)

d~  (1  )F ( j x
)
f( j x) Q^

+ (1  )F ( j x
)
f( j x)

(53)
which depends on x only via its impact on F=f .
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